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Comments
David C. Campbell*
Medical Monitoring:  The Viability of
a New Cause of Action in Oregon
On August 21, 2001, Oregon took one step closer to entering
the national debate regarding “medical monitoring.”  A class ac-
tion, filed by a Beaverton, Oregon, couple, asserted that nine
vaccine manufacturers and distributors, a pediatrician, and a
clinic negligently failed to inform parents of the risk of mercury
exposure from thimerosal-based vaccinations and the availability
of mercury-free alternatives.1
The complaint alleged that childhood contact with mercury-
laced vaccines increases the risk of neurological damage and au-
tism.2  In addition to claims in negligence, fraud, and products
liability, among others, $1,000 was sought per child for future
medical testing under a medical monitoring theory.3  The class
action, which could extend to thousands of families nationwide,
places the state of Oregon at the forefront of the national search
for answers about autism, and puts the Oregon courts in an influ-
ential position to determine the future viability of the medical
monitoring claim.
In a medical monitoring suit, the plaintiff seeks to recover the
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2003.  Associate Editor, Oregon Law
Review , 2002-2003.  This Comment would not have been possible without the assis-
tance of Professor Ian Gallacher, Williams Dailey O’Leary Craine & Love, P.C., J.
William Attridge, David L. Young, Natalie Scott, Katherine C. Chamberlain, Louis
M. Bubala III, and the continuing support of my parents, D. Wayne and Janice
Campbell.
1 First Amended Complaint, Mead v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 0107-07136 (Cir.
Ct. Multnomah County, Or., filed Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.mercvacalliance.com/FINAL%20AM%20CMPLT.pdf.
2 Id.  at 10.
3 Id.  at 39.
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anticipated costs of diagnostic testing necessary to detect latent
diseases that could develop as a result of tortious exposure to
toxic substances.4  Such screening measures, it is reasoned, will
prevent disease or at least detect it early enough to facilitate
early treatment for exposure victims.5  However, despite obvious
policy reasons in favor of compensating innocent toxic tort plain-
tiffs, one practical problem cannot be overlooked:  exposure
plaintiffs often do not suffer from a present physical injury, nor
will they necessarily in the future.
For two hundred years now,6 in promoting its goals of compen-
sation, cost allocation, and deterrence,7 the tort system has re-
quired plaintiffs to allege an actual injury to file suit.  But in the
past twenty years, this longstanding prerequisite has unraveled
substantially.  In fact, less than one quarter of the jurisdictions to
have considered medical monitoring still insist on a physical
injury.8
This Comment examines whether Oregon should recognize
medical monitoring as an independent cause of action despite the
absence of this traditional tort requirement.  Part I traces the de-
velopment of the medical monitoring claim from its origins in the
early 1980s to recent case decisions.  Part II briefly outlines sev-
eral established arguments in favor of a medical monitoring tort,
while Part III more thoroughly examines arguments against the
judicial creation of the tort.  Specifically, this Comment examines
the legislature’s role in creating a medical monitoring action and
the subsequent flood of litigation the tort may inspire.  Addi-
tional complexities in proving causation in toxic torts and Ore-
gon’s ultimate repose statute also present obstacles to the claim’s
success.  Finally, recent case law suggests that the lack of uni-
formity among courts regarding medical monitoring necessitates
4 See  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1990).
5 See id . at 852.
6 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes? , 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1999).
7 Diane P. Wood, Commentary on the Futures Problem, By Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. , 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2000).
8 See  James M. Garner et al., Medical Monitoring:  The Evolution of a Cause of
Action , 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,024 n.68 (2000) (citing Thomas v. FAG Bearings
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc., 940 F.2d 651 (4th
Cir. 1991) (Virginia); Bowerman v. United Illuminating, 23 CONN. L. RPTR. 589
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del.
1984)); see also  Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002); Hinton ex
rel.  Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
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rejection of the proposed tort until decided otherwise by the leg-
islature.  Noting no controlling precedent in Oregon for the via-
bility of medical monitoring as a cause of action or remedy, this
Comment concludes that the Oregon courts should recognize
medical monitoring solely as an item of damages and leave the
creation of a new tort to the wisdom of the Oregon legislature.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDICAL
MONITORING CLAIM
Twenty years ago medical monitoring was generally unheard
of.  Today, however, tort litigants seeking recovery from toxic ex-
posure are increasingly utilizing such claims.  Medical monitoring
claims, also known as medical surveillance claims, seek recovery
for the costs of periodic, long-term diagnostic testing used to de-
tect the onset of latent injuries or diseases caused by exposure to
toxins or other tortious acts.9  Such claims are meant to reim-
burse the cost of future, periodic medical examinations,10 but do
not provide recovery for actual treatment expenses.  Medical
monitoring actions have been brought in various contexts, in-
cluding pharmaceuticals,11 medical devices,12 asbestos,13 second-
hand smoke,14 and real property contamination.15
To date, more than twenty states have addressed the issue of
medical monitoring.16  In those states, courts are divided on
9 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 429 (W. Va. 1999).
10 Id.
11 See , e.g. , Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
12 See , e.g. , Gillett v. Sofamor, S.N.C., No. 96-7554, 2001 WL 1135304 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 13, 2001).
13 See , e.g. , Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
14 See , e.g. , Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001).
15 See , e.g. , Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
16 See Badillo , 16 P.3d at 438-39 nn.1-2 (citing Petito , 750 So. 2d at 103; Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999)); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green
Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the
Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795
(Cal. 1993); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993);
Meyerhoff v. Turner Constr. Co., 534 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. 1995); Burns v. Jaquays
Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Az. Ct. App. 1987); Ayers , 525 A.2d at 287; Elam v.
Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Illinois law); Witherspoon v.
Philip Morris Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying District of Columbia
law); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995) (apply-
ing Kansas law); Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (applying Ohio
law); Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 530 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (applying
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whether to recognize medical monitoring as a separate cause of
action or only as a remedy.17  However, while the majority of
decisions find medical monitoring solely an item of damages,18
there is clearly a lack of consensus on this issue and in many
other issues involved in medical monitoring.19
One of the earliest cases analyzing medical monitoring is
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp .20
There, suit was brought on behalf of 149 Vietnamese orphans
who were aboard a plane bound for the United States that
crashed in Vietnam.21  Although the children displayed no physi-
cal symptoms, the plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of decom-
pression in the cabin or the crash itself, the children suffered
from a neurological development disorder known as Minimal
Brain Dysfunction.22  The plaintiffs sought, among other dam-
ages, compensation from the aircraft manufacturer for the ex-
pense of diagnostic examinations and continued medical
monitoring.23
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia al-
lowed the action for medical monitoring damages, holding that
medical surveillance expenses are recoverable without proof of
present physical injury.24  The court used its now often quoted
hypothetical to illustrate:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding
through a red light.  Jones lands on his head with some force.
Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors
recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine
Kentucky law); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991)
(applying Colorado law); Ball v. Joy Techs., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying
West Virginia and Virginia law); Stead v. F.E. Myers Co., 785 F. Supp. 56 (D. Vt.
1990) (applying Vermont law)); see also Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849
(Ky. 2002); Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(applying Washington law); Hinton ex rel.  Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So.2d 827
(Ala. 2001).
17 Badillo , 16 P.3d at 438, 440.
18 Id.  at 440.
19 Courts diverge on many medical monitoring issues, including:  whether an ac-
tual, present injury is required, the necessary elements to establish a medical moni-
toring claim, the level of certainty that a disease or illness will be contracted, the
necessity that treatment for the disease be currently available, the proper distribu-
tion of medical monitoring awards, and class certification.
20 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21 Id.  at 819.
22 Id.
23 Id.  at 818-19.
24 Id.  at 824-25.
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whether he has suffered any internal head injuries.  The tests
prove negative, but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out
to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations.25
The court concluded that even in the absence of physical in-
jury, Jones should be able to recover the costs for all diagnostic
examinations proximately caused by Smith.26  The court
explained:
The motorbike rider, through his negligence, caused the plain-
tiff, in the opinion of medical experts, to need specific medical
services—a cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind
the community generally accepts as part of the wear and tear
of daily life.  Under these principles of tort law, the
motorbiker should pay.27
Likewise, the court found that the plane crash exposed the or-
phans to a risk of serious brain damage.28  Accordingly, because
“comprehensive diagnostic examinations [were] needed to deter-
mine whether and to what extent treatment [was] necessary,”29
the court ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the tests.30
In another early case, Ayers v. Township of Jackson ,31 339 re-
sidents of a New Jersey community alleged that toxic pollutants
leached from a municipal landfill contaminating local well
water.32  Although the plaintiffs did not claim a present physical
injury from exposure to the toxins, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reinstated a jury award of $8,204,500 to cover medical
monitoring expenses.33  In addition, the decision constituted the
first attempt by the judiciary to identify factors in deciding
whether to award medical monitoring costs.  The court stated:
[T]he cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of
damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable ex-
pert testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of
exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seri-
ousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk, the
relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those ex-
posed, and the value of early diagnosis, that such surveillance
to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasona-
25 Id . at 825.
26 Id .
27 Id .
28 Id .
29 Id . (quoting the district court’s Memorandum of Opinion).
30 Id . at 819.
31 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
32 Id.  at 291.
33 Id . at 315.
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ble and necessary.34
To support its holding, the court reasoned that recognizing
medical monitoring as an item of damages is in the public interest
because it will deter polluters, facilitate early detection and treat-
ment of disease, and shift the economic burden of monitoring
costs from innocent plaintiffs to negligent defendants.35
Similar policy interests were considered by the U.S. Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litiga-
tion .36  In Paoli , plaintiffs who either worked or lived adjacent to
the Paoli railroad yard alleged that they suffered from various
illnesses as a result of exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls, also
known as PCBs.37  PCBs were found in dangerously high concen-
tration in the railroad yard’s surrounding air and soil.38  After
considering various cases, including Friends for All Children and
Ayers , the court predicted that Pennsylvania state courts would
recognize an independent action for medical monitoring, stating
the following:
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age,
significant harm can be done to an individual by a tortfeasor,
notwithstanding latent manifestation of that harm.  Moreover,
as we have explained, recognizing this tort does not require
courts to speculate about the probability of future injury.  It
merely requires courts to ascertain the probability that the far
less costly remedy of medical supervision is appropriate.  Al-
lowing plaintiffs to recover the cost of this care deters irre-
sponsible discharge of toxic chemicals by defendants and
encourages plaintiffs to detect and treat their injuries as soon
as possible.  These are conventional goals of the tort system as
it has long existed in Pennsylvania.39
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit modified New
Jersey’s approach in Ayers  by establishing a four-element stan-
dard to raise a medical monitoring claim:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous
substance through the negligent actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a sig-
nificantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical ex-
aminations reasonably necessary.
34 Id . at 312.
35 Id . at 311-12.
36 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990).
37 Id . at 835.
38 Id.
39 Id.  at 852.
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4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the
early detection and treatment of the disease possible and
beneficial.40
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Utah announced a
similar test to recover medical monitoring expenses in that
state.41  In Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. , the plaintiffs
brought concurrent claims for personal injury, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and medical monitoring after being ex-
posed to asbestos while performing renovation work in defen-
dant’s office building.42  After upholding the dismissal of the
personal injury and emotional distress claims for lack of present
physical and mental illnesses, the court refused to reject the med-
ical monitoring claim.43  The court found that, although there was
not a present physical  injury, medical monitoring was still appro-
priate because “the exposure itself and the concomitant need for
medical testing constitute[d] the injury.”44  Like Paoli , Hansen
concluded that medical monitoring does not require the plaintiff
to prove that there is a reasonable medical probability that an
injury will occur.  Rather, it is enough if the exposure simply in-
creases  the plaintiff’s risk of contracting a disease.45
However, in the same year as Hansen , the Supreme Court of
California held in Potter v. Firestone & Rubber Co.  that a mere
showing of increased risk is not enough.46  Rather, the proof
must demonstrate “through reliable medical expert testimony,
that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain  conse-
quence of the plaintiff’s toxic exposure and that the recom-
mended monitoring is reasonable.”47  The more demanding
40 Id.
41 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (requiring
a plaintiff to prove eight elements to recover medical monitoring damages:  (1) ex-
posure; (2) to a toxic substance; (3) which exposure was caused by the defendant’s
negligence; (4) resulting in an increased risk; (5) of a serious disease, illness, or in-
jury; (6) for which a medical test for early detection exists; (7) and for which early
detection is beneficial, meaning that a treatment exists that can alter the course of
the illness; (8) and which test has been prescribed by a qualified physician according
to contemporary scientific principles).
42 Id . at 972.
43 Id . at 978 (holding that “[a] plaintiff forced to incur the cost of medical moni-
toring as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct should be entitled to compensa-
tion for those expenses”).
44 Id.  at 977.
45 Id.  at 979.
46 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
47 Id.  at 800 (emphasis added).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE206.txt unknown Seq: 8  1-MAR-04 13:27
536 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
“reasonably certain” standard adopted in Potter  is utilized in
other jurisdictions as well.48
Potter  relied on several public policy considerations in reach-
ing its decision.  In addition to the deterrence value of recogniz-
ing such a claim, the court recognized that medical monitoring
would also serve “an important public health interest in fostering
access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic
chemicals creates an enhanced risk of diseases . . . .”49  Further-
more, “[t]he availability of a substantial remedy before the con-
sequences of the plaintiff’s exposure are manifest may also have
the beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious future ill-
nesses and thus reduce the overall costs to the responsible par-
ties.”50  Finally, the court restated an argument initially made in
Friends for All Children ,51 that failure to permit recovery of
medical monitoring would disserve “societal notions of fairness
and elemental justice” by requiring innocent exposure victims to
pay examination costs when such expenses are reasonable and
necessary.52
Despite the prevalence of court decisions discarding the need
for a present, physical injury, at least six courts still demand satis-
faction of this requirement in order to state a medical monitoring
claim.53  In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley ,54
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected medical monitoring
when the plaintiff presented no symptoms or injury of any kind.
Buckley  concerned the viability of a medical monitoring tort
48 See  Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitor-
ing:  Warranted or Wasteful? , 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 128 n.42 (1995) (citing
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986); Schweitzer v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744
P.2d 705, 707 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d
242, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
49 Potter , 863 P.2d at 824.
50 Id . (citations omitted).
51 746 F.2d at 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
52 Potter , 863 P.2d at 824.
53 See  Garner et al., supra  note 8, at 10,024 n.68 (citing Thomas v. FAG Bearings
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc., 940 F.2d 651 (4th
Cir. 1991) (Virginia); Bowerman v. United Illuminating, 23 CONN. L. RPTR. 589
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del.
1984)); see also  Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002); Hinton ex
rel.  Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
54 521 U.S. 424 (1997). Buckley  still is good law following Norfolk & Western
Railway Co. v. Ayers, 583 U.S. 135 (2003), which addressed only emotional distress
damages, and not medical monitoring, in FELA claims.
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under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).55  Buckley,
a pipefitter for the Metro-North railroad, alleged that his em-
ployer negligently exposed him to asbestos for approximately
one hour each working day for three years.56
In dicta, the Court expressed several policy considerations
against creating an independent cause of action for medical mon-
itoring.57  Specifically, the Court addressed its concern that a
medical monitoring tort could produce an overflow of litigation
that would deplete the funds necessary to compensate those who
actually suffer injuries.58  The Court said “tens of millions of indi-
viduals may have suffered exposure to substances that might jus-
tify some form of substance-exposure-related medical
monitoring. . . . And that fact, along with uncertainty as to the
amount of liability, could threaten . . . a ‘flood’ of less important
cases.”59  The Court continued:
[W]e are . . . troubled  . . . by the potential systemic effects of
creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause of action—for exam-
ple, the effects upon interests of other potential plaintiffs who
are not before the court and who depend on a tort system that
can distinguish between reliable and serious claims on the one
hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.
The reality is that competing interests are at stake—and those
interests sometimes can be reconciled in ways other than sim-
ply through the creation of a full-blown, traditional, tort law
cause of action.60
In concluding that an exposed plaintiff can recover “related
reasonable medical monitoring costs if and when he develops
symptoms,”61 the Court suggested, at least in FELA actions,62 a
55 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2002).
56 Buckley , 521 U.S. at 427.  Buckley’s job required the removal of insulation from
pipes in the steam tunnels of Grand Central Station.  Upon completion of such
work, pipefitters like Buckley would be “covered from head to toe with” asbestos
and, for that reason, “were dubbed ‘the snowmen of Grand Central.’” Id . at 446
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57 Id.  at 442-44.
58 Id.  at 442.
59 Id.
60 Id.  at 443-44.
61 Id.  at 438 (emphasis added).
62 Court application of Buckley  beyond FELA actions, however, has had an unex-
pected awakening recently—particularly in state courts. See , e.g. , Wood v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002); Hinton ex rel.  Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813
So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001); Cf.  Donald L. DeVries & Ian Gallacher, Medical Monitoring
in Drug and Medical Device Cases:  Taking the Temperature of a New Theory , 68
DEF. COUNS. J. 163, 176 (2001) (describing that “[i]t is unclear, at best, that the state
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present physical injury still is required.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court added another twist to medi-
cal monitoring in Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the
Army ,63 decided one month before Buckley .  In that case, the
U.S. Army sold a piece of property that was formerly a landfill to
a municipality.64  The municipality then converted the property
into a soccer field.65  After learning that the field had been previ-
ously contaminated with toxic materials, a local soccer club filed
suit against the Army and the U.S. Department of Defense seek-
ing the creation of a medical monitoring trust fund.66  Even
though none of the plaintiffs suffered an actual injury, the court
maintained that, on remand, diagnostic monitoring expenses are
recoverable and may be properly borne by the defendants.67
Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court departed from
the previous standard utilized in Paoli  and Hansen68 and held
that a medical monitoring claim is not  contingent on a showing
that a treatment currently exists for the disease that is the subject
of medical monitoring.69  Such a requirement, the court rea-
soned, “would unfairly prevent a plaintiff from taking advantage
of advances in medical science.”70
The West Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Redland Soccer
Club  and also eliminated the requirement that medical monitor-
courts, considering state law causes of action, will be particularly swayed by the
opinion of the Supreme Court in a decision limited solely to federal common law”).
63 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997).
64 Id . at 139.
65 Id.
66 Id.  at 139-40.
67 Id.  at 145 (holding that a plaintiff must prove seven elements to prevail on a
medical monitoring claim:
(1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2) to a proven haz-
ardous substance; (3) caused by the defendant’s negligence; (4) as a proxi-
mate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of
contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring procedure exists that
makes the early detection of the disease possible; (6) the prescribed moni-
toring regime is different from that normally recommended in the absence
of the exposure; and (7) the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably
necessary according to contemporary scientific principles).
68 Both Paoli  and Hansen  required that in order to recover the cost of medical
monitoring, there must be a currently available treatment method for the disease
that is the subject of medical monitoring.
69 Redland Soccer Club , 696 A.2d at 146 n.8 (“[W]e do not require a plaintiff to
show that a treatment currently exists for the disease that is the subject of medical
monitoring.”).
70 Id.
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ing be contingent on existing treatment protocol.71  In Bower v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. , the court said “[w]e agree with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that a plaintiff should not be re-
quired to show that a treatment currently exists for the disease
that is the subject of medical monitoring.  In this age of rapidly
advancing medical science, we are hesitant to impose such a
static requirement.”72
To support its decision, Bower  relied on the Louisiana Su-
preme Court decision in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries,
Inc.73  To justify compensability even when a treatment for the
disease does not exist, Bourgeois  said:
One thing that . . . a plaintiff might gain [even in the absence
of available treatment] is certainty as to his fate, whatever it
might be.  If a plaintiff has been placed at an increased risk for
a latent disease through exposure to a hazardous substance,
absent medical monitoring, he must live each day with the un-
certainty of whether the disease is present in his body.  If,
however, he is able to take advantage of medical monitoring
and the monitoring detects no evidence of disease, then, at
least for the time being, the plaintiff can receive the comfort of
peace of mind.  Moreover, even if medical monitoring did de-
tect evidence of an irreversible and untreatable disease, the
plaintiff might still achieve some peace of mind through this
knowledge by getting his financial affairs in order, making
lifestyle changes, and, even perhaps, making peace with es-
tranged loved ones or with his religion.  Certainly, those op-
tions should be available to the innocent plaintiff who finds
himself at an increased risk for a serious latent disease through
no fault of his own.74
Bower  came to the state supreme court as a certified question
from the District Court for the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia.75  The plaintiffs maintained that they were exposed to toxic
substances from defendants’ two-acre “cullet pile,” which con-
tained debris from the manufacture of light bulbs.76
In recognizing medical monitoring as an independent claim
even in the absence of a physical injury,77 Bower  made clear that
71 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
72 Id.  at 433-34 (citation omitted).
73 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998).
74 Bower , 522 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting Bourgeois , 716 So. 2d at 363 (Calogero, C.J.,
concurring)).
75 Id . at 426.
76 Id . at 426-27.
77 Id . at 430 (“We now reject the contention that a claim for future medical ex-
penses must rest upon the existence of present physical harm.”).
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toxic exposure plaintiffs still suffer a compensable injury suffi-
cient to state a cause of action.78  Citing the Restatement , the
court said “[t]he ‘injury’ that underlies a claim for medical moni-
toring–just as with any other cause of action sounding in tort–is
‘the invasion of any legally protected interest,’” which includes
one’s interest in avoiding medical testing.79  The Restatement ’s
definition of “injury” was first used in the medical monitoring
context by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in
Friends for All Children , previously discussed.80  There the court
said:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in
avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she
has an interest in avoiding physical injury.  When a defendant
negligently invades this interest, the injury to which is neither
speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the de-
fendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations.81
Accordingly, Bower  concluded that a physical injury is not re-
quired to recover in medical monitoring cases.82  In aligning itself
with other jurisdictions that considered the claim, the court con-
cluded “a cause of action exists under West Virginia law for the
recovery of medical monitoring costs, where it can be proven that
such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to be in-
curred as a proximate result of a defendant’s tortious conduct.”83
A cause of action for medical monitoring was also recognized
in Florida in Petito v. A.H. Robins Co.84  Users of Fenfluramine
and Phentermine (Fen-Phen) pharmaceutical weight loss prod-
ucts filed a state-wide class action against the manufacturers and
sellers.85  Although none of the plaintiffs suffered a physical in-
jury, they claimed that ingestion of the two drugs placed them at
increased risk of developing cardiac and circulatory ailments.86
78 Id.
79 Id.  (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965)).
80 Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826
(C.A.D.C. 1984).  Similar reasoning was also utilized in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green
Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1998), Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
863 P.2d 795, 822-23 (Cal. 1993), and Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287,
308 (N.J. 1987).
81 Friends for All Children , 746 F.2d at 826.
82 Bower , 522 S.E.2d at 430.
83 Id.  at 431.
84 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
85 Id.  at 104.
86 Id.
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They sought a court supervised medical monitoring program to
avoid and mitigate damages.87
The court authorized the medical monitoring fund, finding
that, although the claimants did not sustain physical injury, the
expense of future diagnostic testing constituted an “injury”
within the meaning of the Restatement .88  A different result, the
court warned, would unfairly impact many of society’s most un-
derprivileged members:
One can hardly dispute that an individual has just as great an
interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations as in
avoiding physical injury.  Although one might suggest that
plaintiffs should wait until after the expenses of monitoring
have been incurred before a cognizable claim arises, such a
holding would foreclose countless economically disadvantaged
individuals from obtaining the supervision that they need, and,
regardless of financial need, simply force the victims, rather
than the wrongdoers, to initially bear these great expenses.
Such a result is untenable in a court of equity.89
After adopting the seven-prong medical monitoring test used
in Redland Soccer Club ,90 the Petito  court concluded “[w]e find
nothing in Florida law barring [a medical monitoring] claim and
caselaw, equity, common sense, and the decisions of courts
around the country persuade us that under . . . limited and appro-
priate circumstances . . . such a claim is viable and necessary to
do justice.”91
Finally, Hinton v. Monsanto Co.92 and Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
87 Id . at 104-05. Petito  provides a detailed discussion on the supervision of medi-
cal monitoring funds.  Specifically, the court found that once the elements of a medi-
cal monitoring claim are established, the trial court should:  (1) appoint a plan
administrator; (2) approve an advisory panel to establish the qualifications for par-
ticipation, the tests, and procedures to be performed, and the physicians who will
perform the tests; (3) establish a notification process sufficient to bring the opportu-
nity for monitoring to the attention of those who have used the medication; (4)
establish a time frame for those eligible to obtain the monitoring; and (5) implement
procedures whereby the monitoring physicians submit their reports and findings to
the plan administrator who then pays the reasonable amount of the claims. Id . at
106-08.
88 Id . at 105.  As noted in the discussion of Friends for All Children and Bower ,
the Restatement  defines “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected interest of
another.” Id . (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965)).
89 Petito , 750 So. 2d at 105 (citation omitted).
90 Id . at 106-07.  The elements necessary to establish a medical monitoring claim
under Redland Soccer Club  are provided, supra , in note 67.
91 Id.  at 108 (citations omitted).
92 Hinton ex rel.  Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
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Laboratories ,93 two of the most recent decisions, suggest a rela-
tively unexpected trend may be developing in medical monitor-
ing.  There, the supreme courts of Alabama and Kentucky
refused to recognize medical monitoring as an independent cause
of action where a present physical injury did not exist.  Both deci-
sions also marked an awakening of Buckley  in state court  pro-
ceedings, long thought to be applicable only to FELA and
federal common law claims.
Hinton , another hazardous contamination case, involved the
environmental release of PCBs by a defendant chemical com-
pany.94  Relying on the state’s long-standing commitment to the
physical injury requirement, the Alabama Supreme Court sum-
marily rejected the claim for medical monitoring costs.  The court
said:
Although we acknowledge that other jurisdictions have recog-
nized medical monitoring as a distinct cause of action or as a
remedy under other tort causes of action, even in the absence
of a present physical injury, we do not and need not know how
such jurisdictions coordinated that recognition with the tradi-
tional tort-law requirement of a present injury.  Here, the
plaintiff has not alleged a present injury.  He seeks simply to
recover the costs of monitoring his health to detect whether he
develops an illness or an injury in the future as a result of his
exposure to PCBs.  He has not alleged a cause of action under
our long-standing tort law, and we find insufficient justifica-
tion to expand Alabama law in the direction urged by
plaintiff.95
The Supreme Court of Kentucky reached the same conclusion:96
Courts in some states, however, are venturing into uncharted
territory as they create medical monitoring causes of action
and make available medical monitoring remedies that do not
require a showing of present physical injury.  In these states,
the costs of diagnostic testing can be recovered before they are
actually incurred on a mere showing of exposure coupled with
increased risk of injury.  In the name of sound policy, we de-
cline to depart from well-settled principles of tort law.97
Hinton  and Wood  also recognized the significant public policy
problems medical monitoring would likely produce.  For exam-
ple, Wood  noted that due to the administrative difficulties courts
93 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002).
94 Hinton , 813 So. 2d at 828.
95 Id . at 829.
96 Wood , 82 S.W.3d at 852.
97 Id.  at 856.
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would face in coordinating large victim classes, many toxic claim-
ants may not actually receive necessary diagnostic testing, while
others, if given a lump sum award, may not use the money for
medical costs.98  The court also noted that due to constraints on
defendants’ financial resources, providing for medical monitoring
expenses would, unfortunately, “impair [the defendants’] ability
to fully compensate victims who emerge years later with actual
injuries that require immediate attention.”99
Finally, both courts also recognized the fear, as discussed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley , that medical monitoring
makes virtually everyone  a potential claimant.100  While acknowl-
edging that Buckley  was based on the FELA and federal com-
mon law, the Alabama Supreme Court in Hinton  adopted the
Court’s counter-arguments, and concluded:
[W]e find it inappropriate . . . to stand Alabama tort law on its
head in an attempt to alleviate . . . concerns about what might
occur in the future.  We believe that Alabama law, as it cur-
rently exists, must be applied to balance the delicate and com-
peting policy considerations presented here.  That law
provides no redress for a plaintiff who has no present injury or
illness.101
II
ARGUMENTS FAVORING MEDICAL MONITORING AS
AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
IN OREGON
Many of the arguments in favor of medical monitoring are self-
evident.  First, in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,102 dis-
cussed above, the California Supreme Court identified the four
primary public policy considerations supporting medical
monitoring:
First, there is an important public health interest in fostering
access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to
toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease, particu-
larly in light of the value of early diagnosis and treatment for
98 Id . at 857.
99 Id .
100 Both Hinton  and Wood  cited Buckley  for the proposition that “tens of mil-
lions of individuals may have suffered exposure to substances that might justify
some form of substance-exposure-related medical monitoring.” Buckley , 521 U.S. at
442. See Wood , 82 S.W.3d at 857; Hinton , 813 So. 2d at 831.
101 Hinton , 813 So. 2d at 831-32 (emphasis in original).
102 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
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many cancer patients.  Second, there is a deterrence value in
recognizing medical surveillance claims . . . . Third, the availa-
bility of a substantial remedy before the consequences of the
plaintiffs’ exposure are manifest may also have the beneficial
effect of preventing or mitigating serious future illnesses and
thus reduce the overall costs to the responsible parties . . . .
Finally, societal notions of fairness and elemental justice are
better served by allowing recovery of medical monitoring
costs. That is, it would be inequitable for an individual wrong-
fully exposed to dangerous toxins, but unable to prove that
cancer or disease is likely, to have to pay the expense of medi-
cal monitoring when such intervention is clearly reasonable
and necessary.103
Second, medical monitoring is considered to be injunctive and
equitable in nature,104 which gives courts broad discretion in de-
termining whether and to what extent relief should be granted.
In Hickman v. Six Dimension Custom Homes, Inc. ,105 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court noted that “[i]njunctive relief depends upon
broad principles of equity and may, in the discretion of the court,
be granted or denied in accordance with the justice and equity of
the case.  Courts balance the equities between the parties in de-
termining what, if any, relief to give.”106  Because medical moni-
toring is not monetary in nature, Oregon courts would be less
constrained by traditional tort theories of recovery, and there-
fore, at least in theory, better able to tailor remedies to the spe-
cific circumstances of its cases.
Third, while Oregon courts have yet to address whether a
plaintiff is entitled to recover medical monitoring  costs, the
courts have traditionally allowed plaintiffs to recover future med-
ical expenses.107  In Harris v. Kissling , the plaintiff sought dam-
ages for future medical expenses after a hospital failed to
conduct proper blood tests and to inoculate her following the
103 Id.  at 824 (citations omitted).
104 See , e.g. , Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d
816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding the district court’s mandatory preliminary injunc-
tion compelling defendants to create a medical monitoring fund); Hansen v. Moun-
tain Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 982 (Utah 1993) (stating that use of a court supervised
fund to administer medical monitoring “is a highly appropriate use of the Court’s
equitable powers”).
105 543 P.2d 1043 (Or. 1975).
106 Id.  at 1045 (citations omitted).
107 See , e.g. , Barrett v. Landis, 575 P.2d 154, 157 (Or. 1978) (“We find evidence
supporting a claim for damages for impairment of future earning capacity, future
medical expenses and permanent disability.”); Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838 (Or.
App. 1986).
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birth of her first child.108  The failure caused Rh antibodies to
develop in her bloodstream.109  While the antibodies did not
compromise the plaintiff’s health specifically, they did greatly in-
crease the likelihood that she would suffer complications requir-
ing diagnostic testing and other preventative measures in a future
pregnancy.110
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the award for future
medical expenses and concluded that “[b]oth the Supreme Court
and this court have held that a jury can consider future possibili-
ties in determining damages and that evidence of the degree of
likelihood should be admitted for the jury’s determination.”111
Finally, the Oregon appellate courts have the power to decide
whether to create a new cause of action.  In Nees v. Hocks ,112 the
Oregon Supreme Court announced its willingness, in appropriate
cases, to create new causes of action.  The court explained:  “This
court has not felt unduly restricted by the boundaries of pre-ex-
isting common-law remedies.  We have not hesitated to create or
recognize new torts when confronted with conduct causing inju-
ries which we feel should be compensable.”113
III
ARGUMENTS REJECTING MEDICAL MONITORING AS
AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
IN OREGON
Whether Oregon will recognize the viability of medical moni-
toring in tort or remedy depends on its willingness to grant re-
covery when no physical injury is present.  “[M]edical monitoring
relief fundamentally alters one of the cornerstones of the civil
justice system, because it allows recovery on behalf of one who
has, by definition, sustained no injury and might not sustain an
injury in the future.”114
However, proponents of a medical monitoring tort argue that
an injury does in fact exist, albeit not physical in nature.  The
“injury” has been characterized as both “the exposure itself and
108 Harris , 721 P.2d at 839.
109 Id .
110 Id . at 841.
111 Id .
112 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
113 Id . at 514; see also  Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941).
114 DeVries & Gallacher, supra  note 62, at 163.
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the concomitant need for medical testing,”115 and “the invasion
of any legally protected interest.”116  As illustrated in Part I,
many courts are amenable to these characterizations, but will ei-
ther be enough in Oregon?
In Barrett  and Harris , the future medical expenses cases iden-
tified in Part II, the Oregon courts faced plaintiffs who suffered
from actual, existing injuries  at the time they sought recovery.
For example, in Barrett , the plaintiff was awarded future medical
expenses as part of a verdict for personal injuries  arising out of
an automobile collision.117  And, in Harris , the Oregon Court of
Appeals concluded that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the
hospital’s failure to immunize her, which “resulted in an irrevers-
ible physical change in her blood, which [had] permanently im-
paired her ability to have a normal pregnancy.”118
In contrast, plaintiffs in the Mead  class action, summarized in
the introduction, do not  allege an identifiable injury in their com-
plaint, nor do they seek to show one.  The complaint reads:
“This lawsuit seeks equitable relief for children exposed to doses
of toxic ethyl mercury via injection with thimerosal, but who have
so far not manifested any signs or symptoms of mercury induced
injury  . . . .”119
Moreover, Oregon’s products liability statute120 requires a
plaintiff to prove a present, existing physical harm as an element
of recovery in a product liability action.121  The statute, Oregon
Revised Statute section 30.900, limits product liability claims to
circumstances of “personal injury, death or property damage”
and imposes liability only for “physical harm or damage to
property.”122
The following materials argue that the creation of a medical
monitoring tort by the Oregon courts is not appropriate.  Instead,
115 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993); see also
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds:  The Periodic Payment of
Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation , 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 661, 675 (1992) (“[A]n individual who is forced to undergo medical testing as a
result of a defendant’s conduct has suffered a present, compensable injury, i.e., ex-
posure to a level necessitating medical surveillance.”).
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965).
117 Barrett v. Landis, 575 P.2d 154, 155 (Or. 1978).
118 Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838 (Or. App. 1986).
119 First Amended Complaint, supra  note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
120 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.900 (2001).
121 See , e.g. , Sealey v. Hicks, 768 P.2d 428, 430 (Or. App. 1989).
122 § 30.920(1).
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this decision should be left to the wisdom of the legislature,
which can carefully balance the need for a new cause of action
against the potential flood of litigation the tort will likely initiate.
In addition, while Oregon courts have the authority to create a
new tort, such action is inappropriate for the majority of toxic
exposure cases because of the inherent difficulties in proving
causation.  Moreover, even if causation can be established, Ore-
gon’s ultimate repose statute will bar many claimants who suffer
from latent onset of a particular disease or illness.  Finally, the
refusal to create a medical monitoring tort is consistent with re-
cent decisions rejecting the claim based on lack of uniformity
among courts that have considered the claim.
A. The Oregon Legislature is Better Suited Than the Courts to
Consider the Issues Involved in Medical Monitoring
The Oregon Legislative Assembly is better suited than the
courts to revise our tort system by eliminating the physical injury
requirement.  Legislatures “are well-equipped to reach fully in-
formed decisions about the need for widespread changes in the
law.  They have more complete access to information, including
the ability to receive comments from persons representing a mul-
tiplicity of perspectives.”123  In contrast, courts are limited to the
inconsistencies presented in expert testimony, which often con-
sists of “confusing, highly technical presentations of scientific evi-
dence.”124  This, expectedly, can result in expert witnesses
leading “factfinders astray by tangling them in a web of statistical
uncertainties and standards of persuasion.”125
In another recent medical monitoring decision, Duncan v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. , the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington refused to create a medical monitoring
tort finding that, under the circumstances, such action would be
more appropriately settled by the legislature.126  In deferring the
123 Schwartz et al., supra  note 6, at 1072.
124 Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Expo-
sure Cases:  Medical Monitoring and Daubert , 17 REV. LITIG. 551, 568 (1998).
125 Id .
126 Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 608-09 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
see also  Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002) (“Traditional
tort law militates against recognition of [medical monitoring] claims, and we are not
prepared to step into the legislative role and mutate otherwise sound principles.”);
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001) (creating a new cause of
action is “generally a legislative, not a judicial, function”); Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987) (stating
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decision, the court concluded “[t]he legislature has a ‘greater
ability to fully explore the spectrum of competing societal inter-
ests,’ while the judiciary ‘is the least capable of receiving public
input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a so-
cietal consensus.’”127
In Duncan , the plaintiff brought suit against her employer,
Northwest Airlines, Inc., for injuries caused by an airline policy
that permitted smoking on international flights, thereby exposing
her and other flight attendants to second-hand smoke.128  In ad-
dition, Duncan asserted a separate cause of action for medical
monitoring.129
While the Washington Supreme Court traditionally yields to
the legislature to create new torts, Duncan  found that the state
judiciary can create independent actions on its own when no
other remedy is available.130  There, because Duncan actually
suffered a present physical injury, the court found that medical
monitoring was already available as a remedy  to a negligence
cause of action, and therefore, the creation of a new medical
monitoring tort was unnecessary.131
Such reasoning appears consistent with Oregon case law.132  In
Gross-Haentjens v. Leckenby ,133 the Oregon Court of Appeals
considered a claim brought under Oregon’s consumer fraud stat-
“[t]he overwhelming conclusion of the commentators who have evaluated
[toxic tort litigation] is that the accommodation has failed, that common-
law tort doctrines are ill-suited to the resolution of such injury claims, and
that some form of statutorily-authorized compensation procedure is re-
quired if the injuries sustained by victims of chemical contamination are to
be fairly redressed”)
(citations omitted); see also  Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that expansion of state law on public policy grounds is “better left to the
respective legislatures and highest courts”).
127 Duncan , 203 F.R.D. at 606 (quoting Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759, 761
(Wash. 1988)).
128 Id.  at 603.  Note that a primary difference between Duncan  and the cases ex-
amined in Part I, is that Duncan actually suffered from a present physical injury.
Duncan alleged that she “currently suffers injuries from exposure to the second-
hand smoke, including irritated eyes, sinus problems, breathing problems, sore
throats, and other present complaints.” Id .
129 Id.  Specifically, Duncan sought “funding for diagnosis and treatment of re-
sulting injuries and illnesses,” including, lung cancer and heart and respiratory dis-
ease. Id.  at 603-04.
130 Id.  at 605-06.
131 Id.  at 606.
132 See , e.g. , Gross-Haentjens v. Leckenby, 589 P.2d 1209 (Or. App. 1979).
133 Id . at 1211.
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ute, the Unlawful Trade Practices Act.134  The court rejected
plaintiff’s invitation to create a new personal injury tort empha-
sizing that other  remedies were already available to purchasers of
defective goods.135  The court said “[t]his is not a case in which a
plaintiff with no remedy or an inadequate remedy asks this court
to recognize a new common law cause of action.”136  Rather,
“[p]ersons suffering personal injuries as the result of defective
goods, including defective brakes on automobiles, already have
remedies against the manufacturers and sellers of such goods in
causes of action for negligence, breach of warranty and ‘strict
liability.’”137
Likewise, in the Mead  amended complaint, claims for negli-
gence, negligent failure to warn, common law fraud, unjust en-
richment, and strict products liability are all asserted against the
vaccine manufacturers, in addition to medical monitoring.138
Any one of these traditional tort theories could conceivably
serve as the basis for collection of medical surveillance damages.
Like many exposure cases, the Mead  class action does not appear
dependent on the creation of a medical monitoring tort.  Rather,
future medical testing and diagnostic examination expenses are
recoverable under existing tort theories (e.g., negligence).
Finally, as discussed in Part II, the creation of a medical moni-
toring tort is based largely, if not exclusively, on public policy
considerations.  Oregon case law suggests that public policy con-
siderations should not be the foundation for a court’s  creation of
a new tort.  The Oregon Supreme Court stated recently in Ben-
nett v. Farmers Insurance Co.139 that “ordinarily, the creation of
law for reasons of public policy . . . is a task assigned to the legis-
lature, not to the courts.”
In sum, the significant public policy concerns inherent in the
creation of a medical monitoring tort suggest that the issue
should be decided by the Oregon legislature.  The legislature not
only has the ability to resolve the broad public policy issues
raised by medical monitoring, but also has better access than the
134 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638 (2001).
135 Gross-Haentjens , 589 P.2d at 1211.
136 Id .
137 Id.
138 See  First Amended Complaint, supra  note 1, at 22-36.
139 26 P.3d 785, 792-93 (Or. 2001); see also  DeMedoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232,
1243 (Or. 2002) (citing Bennett  with approval).
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courts to information indispensable to making such far-reaching
decisions.
B. The Medical Monitoring Tort Could Produce a “Flood”
of Litigation
The creation of a medical monitoring tort could lead to poten-
tial abuse through a rash of meritless litigation.  As the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Buckley , creating a medical monitoring
cause of action without proof of a present physical injury may
spur an overflow of unsubstantiated cases.140
Such a wave of actions by less-deserving claimants could
“clog” the courts, thereby preventing the efforts of the more seri-
ously injured.141  One commentator, Victor E. Schwartz, wrote:
[O]n a daily basis, almost everyone comes into contact with a
potentially limitless number of materials that, arguably, may
warrant a medical monitoring remedy.  Indeed, people are
“exposed to potential health hazards each day through the air
they breathe, water they drink, food and drugs they ingest, and
on the land on which they live.”142
Such pedestrian exposure led to Justice Maynard’s often-
quoted dissent in Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp .143  Argu-
ing that the majority “exercised no caution whatsoever” in recog-
nizing the medical monitoring tort, Justice Maynard recognized
that a medical surveillance tort had the effect of making “almost
every West Virginian a potential plaintiff in a medical monitoring
cause of action.”144  He said:
Those who work in heavy industries such as coal, oil, gas, tim-
ber, steel, and chemicals as well as those who work in older
office buildings, or handle ink in newspaper offices, or launder
the linens in hotels have, no doubt, come into contact with
hazardous substances.  Now all of these people may be able to
collect money as victorious plaintiffs without any showing of
injury at all.145
140 Buckley , 521 U.S. at 442.
141 Schwartz et al., supra  note 6, at 1080 (stating “[c]ourts could become clogged,
and persons with serious physical injuries would be delayed in having their cases
heard”).
142 Id.  at 1072 (quoting Terry C. Gay & Paige F. Rosato, Combatting Fear of Fu-
ture Injury and Medical Monitoring Claims , 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 554, 562 (1994)); see
also Buckley , 521 U.S. at 434 (stating “contacts, even extensive contacts, with seri-
ous carcinogens are common”).
143 522 S.E.2d 424, 434-36 (W. Va. 1999) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
144 Id.  at 435.
145 Id.
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The Supreme Court of Texas also recognized the pervasiveness
of toxic substance exposure, while warning of the inherent diffi-
culties such exposure cases would present:
The difficulty in predicting whether exposure will cause any
disease and if so, what disease, and the long latency period
characteristic of asbestos-related diseases, make it very diffi-
cult for judges and juries to evaluate which exposure claims
are serious and which are not.  This difficulty in turn makes
liability unpredictable, with some claims resulting in signifi-
cant recovery while virtually indistinguishable claims are de-
nied altogether.  Some claimants would inevitably be
overcompensated when, in the course of time, it happens that
they never develop the disease they feared, and others would
be undercompensated when it turns out that they developed a
disease more serious even than they feared.146
The court concluded that “[i]n a nation already overflowing
with lawsuits, careful consideration must be paid to the risks in-
herent in waiving one of the most fundamental rules of tort law
by allowing medical monitoring claims to proceed without a
showing of present physical injury.”147
In our industrial society, there is an alarming potential for
human contact with toxic substances.  While a plaintiff will still
face the rigors of satisfying each of the basic elements of a medi-
cal monitoring claim, an “exposure to a toxic substance”148 has
become a small hurdle for most claimants to bear.  The availabil-
ity of an independent action could promote the filing of many
meritless claims, thereby delaying the efforts of legitimate expo-
sure plaintiffs.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s warning of a “flood”
of unsubstantiated claims is too real for Oregon to dismiss
through the judicial process.
C. A Judicially-Created Medical Monitoring Tort May be
Improper Because of the Complexities in
Proving Causation
One of the most difficult issues in environmental and toxic tort
litigation is “‘whether the exposure to a toxic substance is the
cause in fact of a plaintiff’s harm.’”149  In traditional tort actions,
146 Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex. 1999).
147 Schwartz et al., supra  note 6, at 1081 (discussing Temple-Inland).
148 See  Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (iden-
tifying the first element in its test to establish a medical monitoring claim).
149 See  Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation:  A
Philosophical View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines , 35 U. RICH. L.
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the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a causal con-
nection exists between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
injury.150  But, due to the latent onset of many toxic torts and the
multiplicity of factors involved, this burden is rarely more trying
than in the context of toxic exposure claims.151  A delayed onset
permits “intervening causes” to alter and even destroy viable
links between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s in-
jury.152  As a result, many toxic tort plaintiffs cannot establish a
prima facie case for want of a direct relationship between expo-
sure and injury.153
Such complexity in proving causation recently led the Nevada
Supreme Court to reject medical monitoring as a cause of action
in a second-hand smoke exposure case.154  In Badillo v. Ameri-
can Brands, Inc. , smokers and casino employees brought class
action suits against cigarette manufacturers and others, seeking
judicial recognition of a medical monitoring cause of action and
the establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring
program.155
In denying the medical monitoring claim, the court concluded
that creating a new tort required a less tenuous and “more clear
cut” cause in fact than that presented in a smoke inhalation
case.156  Finding the creation of a tort inappropriate under the
facts of the case, the court said:
Exposure to environmental tobacco smoke raises many com-
plex issues of legal causality and proof, such as the length and
intensity of exposure necessary to create a significant in-
creased risk or harm.  In addition, causality and proof are
complicated by potential mitigating factors, such as individual
medical history and other co-existing adverse health behav-
iors.  The defendants’ contribution to harm is also not clear-
REV. 875, 886 (2002) (citing GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 4-20, 339 (1994)).
150 See id.  (citing KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41, at 266).
151 Allen T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages:  A Solution to the Inade-
quate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims , 63 IND. L.J. 849, 853 (1988) (“Proving
causation is often the toxic tort plaintiff’s most formidable task.”).
152 Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds:  The Next Step in the Evolution of
Tort Law , 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 765-66 (1994) (citation omitted).
153 See  Slagel, supra  note 151, at 854 (stating that often a “plaintiff cannot meet
her legal burden of proving causation because she cannot demonstrate a cause-in-
fact, or a substantial relationship between her injuries and the toxic substance”).
154 Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001).
155 Id.  at 438.
156 Id.  at 440.
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cut.  Defendant manufacturers made hundreds of different
products containing different ingredients. A toxic exposure
that is discrete and more ascertainable would be less
problematic .157
But finding a toxic exposure that is “discrete” and “ascertaina-
ble” is a formidable task.  Cancer and other exposure-related dis-
eases are widely recognized as having ambiguous etiology, which
complicates “identify[ing] the exact factors causing the dis-
ease.”158  For example, asbestos exposure, ionizing radiation, and
tobacco inhalation have all been implicated in causing lung can-
cer alone.159
Likewise, in the Mead  class action, while mercury exposure
may be a contributing cause of childhood autism,160 countless
other factors may also be responsible, including chromosomal
abnormalities, intrauterine rubella, tuberous sclerosis, Cornelia
de Lange’s syndrome, hydrocephalus, untreated phenylke-
tonuria, infantile spasms, herpes simplex encephalitis, focal brain
lesions and genetic predisposition.161
This complexity in identifying the cause in fact of an injury and
the potential for wrongfully imposing liability on a defendant
may help to explain the legal system’s traditionally narrow con-
struction of causation.  For example, in Oregon, to establish a
cause in fact:
[T]he causal connection between defendant’s acts or omissions
and the plaintiff’s injuries must not be left to surmise or con-
jecture.  The proof of the material issue must have the quality
of reasonable probability, and a mere possibility that the al-
leged negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injuries is not sufficient.162
The Oregon Supreme Court has further explained that
“[w]hen the evidence shows two or more equally probable causes
157 Id.  at 441 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
158 Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases:  Another
Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs? , 33 HOUS. L. REV. 473, 480 (1996) (citing Taylor, supra
note 152, at 758 n.61).
159 Id . (citing Taylor, supra  note 152, at 758).
160 Mercury Vaccine Alliance, at http://www.mercvacalliance.com (last visited Jan.
15, 2004) (“Current clinical and epidemiological research suggests that the mercury-
laden thimerosal so widely given to children by the drug companies in the 1990s
might cause a range of neurological and neurodevelopmental injuries, including
autism.”).
161 Isabelle Rapin, Autism , 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97 (1997), http://www.unc. edu/
~cory/autism-info/autism.html#Causes.
162 Sims v. Dixon, 355 P.2d 478, 480 (Or. 1960).
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of injury, for not all of which the defendant is responsible, no
action for negligence can be maintained.”163  Oregon’s strict con-
struction of causation imposes a heavy burden in toxic exposure
cases in general, and specifically, in the Mead  class action.
In general, courts hold toxic plaintiffs to the same level as
traditional tort claimants, requiring “direct traceability” between
cause and injury.164  But establishing such a close nexus is daunt-
ing.  To satisfy this burden, toxic plaintiffs must merge “epidemi-
ology, toxicology, medical and clinical sciences, quantitative and
qualitative probabilities, physical causation, efficient causation,
legal causation, and legal persuasion” into one coherent product
to state a claim.165  Consequently, in the majority of cases, the
toxic plaintiff will not be able to establish a substantial relation-
ship—let alone a cause in fact—between her alleged injuries and
the defendant’s conduct.166
Nonetheless, the inherent difficulty in proving causation in
toxic tort cases should not discourage claims for medical moni-
toring.  Instead, this reality merely suggests that judicial creation
of the tort, subject to the existing burdens of proof, may be inap-
propriate.  Judicial application of Oregon’s customary causation
standard will likely prove prohibitively difficult for most toxic
claimants, resulting in little, if any, benefit for victims.167  Ac-
cordingly, until action is taken by the state legislature, Oregon
courts should encourage medical monitoring exclusively as a
remedy for existing causes of action.  Such a response will still
serve plaintiff needs of early detection and treatment of latent
disease while preventing the potential for directed verdicts and
other summary dispositions.
D. Oregon’s Ultimate Repose Statute Will Preclude the Claims
of Many Toxic Tort Plaintiffs
Many cancers and diseases caused by hazardous substances
have extremely long latency periods and will not develop until
many years, or even decades, after exposure occurs.  This is in-
163 Simpson v. Hillman, 97 P.2d 527, 529 (Or. 1940).
164 Conway-Jones, supra  note 149, at 878.
165 Id . at 880-81.
166 Jordan, supra  note 158, at 480.
167 See  Myra Paiewonsky Mulcahy, Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litiga-
tion , 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299, 1326 (1983) (providing that “Applying [traditional
notions of causation] to toxic tort cases is analogous to placing a square peg into a
round hole–it just will not fit.”).
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herently problematic to the typical toxic plaintiff who, by await-
ing manifestation, is often left without recourse because the
statute of limitations has expired.168
Oregon has accounted for this inequity by applying the so-
called “discovery rule” to negligence actions.169  In general, a
cause of action will not accrue under the discovery rule until the
claim has been discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have been discovered.170  To determine when a negligence
claim is “discovered,” the court will determine whether the plain-
tiff knew or reasonably should have known facts which would
make a reasonable person aware that a cause of action likely
exists.171
As such, potential toxic tort plaintiffs benefit from the delayed
accrual supplied by Oregon’s discovery rule.  However, because
many prevalent toxic exposure injuries take years to manifest,
often between fifteen and forty years,172 Oregon’s ultimate re-
pose limitation could still bar a bulk of claims otherwise made
available under the discovery rule.
Statutes of ultimate repose set a maximum upper time limit in
which a plaintiff may file a claim, regardless of the date of discov-
ery or other circumstances that may affect the expiration of a
statute of limitations.173  An ultimate repose period “provides a
deadline for the initiation of an action whether or not the injury
has been discovered or has even occurred.”174  This period “can-
168 See Taylor, supra  note 152, at 762 (“The application of the traditional view of
statutes of limitations virtually prohibits recovery in toxic torts.”).
169 See  Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 997 (Or. 1996) (applying the discovery rule
to Oregon Revised Statute section 12.110(1)).
170 Gaston v. Parsons, 864 P.2d 1319, 1324 (Or. 1994); see also  Hutchison v.
Semler, 361 P.2d 803, 807 (Or. 1961) (explaining that “the statute of limitations be-
gan to run . . . when the plaintiff became apprised, or as a reasonable man should
have known, that his health was being undermined by the dust which he was
breathing”).
171 Gaston , 864 P.2d at 1324.
172 Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff:  An
Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs , 46
UCLA L. REV. 1289, 1293-94 (1999) (explaining that cancer, one of the most preva-
lent toxic exposure injuries, has a latent onset because of the interaction of a variety
of factors, including age, sex, socioeconomic status, and nutritional level).
173 See  Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 491 P.2d 203, 205 (Or. 1971) overruled in part on
other grounds by  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001) (pro-
viding that the statute of ultimate repose in Oregon Revised Statute section
12.155(1) is intended to provide overall maximum time limitation).
174 Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435, 438 n.7 (Or. 1990).
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not be extended regardless of unfairness to the plaintiff.”175
Oregon’s ultimate repose statute for negligent injuries pro-
vides “[i]n no event shall any action for negligent injury to per-
son or property of another be commenced more than 10 years
from the date of the act or omission complained of.”176  In With-
ers v. Milbank , the Oregon Court of Appeals explained “[i]n
drafting ORS 12.115(1), the legislature considered the problem
of long-delayed tort litigation brought about by delayed discov-
ery and endeavored to prescribe an ultimate cutoff date beyond
which a specific act or omission is no longer actionable.”177  The
Oregon Supreme Court has strictly construed the words, “in no
event shall any action . . . be commenced more than 10 years” to
clearly indicate that all claims filed after ten years are prohibited
“regardless of circumstances.”178
While the discovery rule will undoubtedly preserve some toxic
tort claims, Oregon’s present statutory scheme is not an effective
safeguard for many of the most prevalent toxic tort claims.
E. The Lack of Uniformity Among Jurisdictions Having
Considered Medical Monitoring Should Deter Oregon
Courts From Creating a New Action
Approximately thirty states have not yet addressed the issue of
medical monitoring.179  But of those that have, lack of consensus
and uniformity in the decision-making suggests that Oregon
should exercise caution in deciding whether to enter the fray.
Two decisions previously discussed, Badillo  and Duncan , both
decided in 2001, rejected medical monitoring as an independent
tort after citing the inconsistencies among jurisdictions.180  In
particular, Badillo  pointed to disagreements in defining the
proper test to establish medical monitoring,181 and whether a
175 DeLay v. Marathon Le Tourneau Sales & Serv. Co., 630 P.2d 836, 839 (Or.
1981).
176 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.115(1) (2001).
177 678 P.2d 770, 771 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
178 Josephs , 491 P.2d at 206.
179 Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 607 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438-39 (Nev. 2001).
180 Badillo , 16 P.3d at 441 (rejecting the medical monitoring claim “[i]n light of
the lack of consensus in other jurisdictions”); Duncan , 203 F.R.D. at 608 (noting
“the ambiguity in case law from other states”).
181 Badillo , 16 P.3d at 441 (identifying five courts that differ from one another in
the elements necessary to state a claim for medical monitoring).
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present physical injury is required.182
The disagreement among courts, though, extends beyond the
disparities identified in Badillo .  First, to establish a medical
monitoring claim, some courts require a reasonable medical
probability that a toxic injury will occur,183 while other courts de-
mand only an increased risk.184  Second, courts split on whether
recovery is contingent on the existence of a present treatment for
a disease that is the subject of medical monitoring.185  Third,
some courts still diverge on whether successful medical monitor-
ing plaintiffs should receive their payments periodically or in
lump sum form.186
Because state legislatures have “superior access to informa-
tion”187 and because judicial efforts to provide certainty to po-
tential claimants in medical monitoring disputes have largely
failed, Oregon courts should reject medical monitoring as a new
cause of action.  By following the lead of Badillo  and Duncan ,
Oregon courts will encourage legislative resolution of the matter,
while serving the grand purpose of not  contributing to this al-
ready muddled area of the law.
CONCLUSION
While there are obvious public policy reasons in favor of creat-
ing a medical monitoring tort, such action is not warranted at this
time by Oregon courts.
Since the 1980s, the legal profession has seen over two hun-
dred years of tort law unravel substantially through judicial aban-
donment of the physical injury requirement.  Only recently have
we witnessed a renewed commitment to this basic principle.  Or-
egon, like Alabama and Kentucky, appears to require a present
physical injury in order to recover future medical expenses, in-
cluding diagnostic testing and other preventative measures.  This
result is consistent, not only with Oregon’s products liability
laws, but also with the nation’s long-standing tort principles of
recovery.
182 Id.  (comparing eleven courts that do or do not require a present physical
injury).
183 See , e.g. , Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823 (Cal. 1993).
184 See , e.g. , Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
185 Compare In re  Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),
with  Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997).
186 See  Garner et al., supra  note 8, at 10,024 n.73.
187 See  Schwartz et al., supra  note 6, at 1073.
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The Mead  class action signifies that Oregon will soon be in a
position to influence the nationwide viability of the medical mon-
itoring claim.  While our courts should not shy from this role,
careful consideration should be given to the following factors
before abandoning the physical injury requirement:  the flood of
claims medical monitoring will likely produce, the difficulties in
proving causation, Oregon’s statutes of ultimate repose, inconsis-
tencies in the national case law, and perhaps most importantly,
our state legislature’s role in the decision.
The refusal to judicially create a medical monitoring cause of
action does not mean that the traditional goals of tort law (e.g.,
deterrence of tortious conduct and compensation for injured
claimants) will go unsatisfied.  Rather, these objectives can still
be met through judicial recognition of medical monitoring as an
item of damages to existing causes of action.
While this end will undoubtedly result in inequity for exposure
victims that are unable to establish a claim under a traditional
tort theory, such injustice may be the impetus needed for legisla-
tive resolution of the medical monitoring dispute here in Oregon,
and nationwide.
